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Abstract—The continuous growth in the number and capabili-
ties of connected Internet of Things (IoT) and consumer devices,
coupled with the increasing diversification of services running
over the Internet, calls for the adoption of cutting-edge technolo-
gies to exchange, store, and process the big amount of generated
data. Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) and Information-centric
Networking (ICN) are candidate enabling technologies to cope
with the raised issues in terms of scalability, low-latency, avail-
ability, reliability, and security.
This paper proposes a protocol for secure and privacy-friendly
service provisioning at the mobile edge, which also provides a
fast way to build trust between consumers (mobile/IoT devices)
and providers (middle tier servers and other mobile devices). The
solution builds upon ICN pillars, in particular upon the Named
Data Networking (NDN) paradigm. The security properties of
the designed protocol are discussed and its behavior practically
shown in a reference use case.
Index Terms—Information-Centric Networking, Named Data
Networking, Mobile Edge Computing, Internet of Things Security
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent studies forecast that the number of wireless con-
nected devices will increase beyond 10 billions worldwide by
2020, with Internet of Things (IoT) and consumer devices
representing the biggest share [1]. This opens up unprece-
dented opportunities for the provisioning of new services and
it is lifting tremendously the requirements in terms of cloud-
based service access. The Mobile/Multiaccess Edge Comput-
ing (MEC) paradigm [2] has recently promoted the idea to
offer cloud-like services (processing, storage, and data access)
at the network edge with lower latency, by relying on a middle
tier of more powerful consumer devices and servers, typically
co-located with access points (APs) and base stations (BSs)
between the end-devices and the remote cloud.
Despite the inherent advantages of offering services at the
mobile edge, this change of paradigm raises new challenges
and calls for the design of proper schemes facilitating ser-
vice naming/description, on-demand deployment, and service
discovery and access operations. Existing edge computing
solutions typically provide add-on primitives and mechanisms
to support the aforementioned functionalities. Moreover, they
often lack adequate security and privacy mechanisms (i) to
validate mutually the identity and trustworthiness of request-
ing nodes (Consumers) and nodes offering their capabilities
(Providers), and (ii) to ensure that input parameters as well as
resulting data are kept private, especially when personalized
service results are requested.
In this work, we propose a solution to support secure
cloudification at the mobile edge “by design”, based on Named
Data Networking (NDN) [3], one of the most prominent
instantiations of the Information-Centric Networking (ICN)
architecture. The expressiveness of the NDN naming scheme
and its built-in Interest/Data primitives well suit the demands
of a mobile edge, as argued in [4] and more recently in
[5]. Indeed, thanks to the detachment from the host-centric
communication model, NDN particularly fits scenarios where
the identity/location of a Provider is not a priori known and
where disconnections of a Provider are frequent.
The solution designed in this paper offers a simple yet
powerful framework that allows mobile devices, outside their
home environment, to discover local service providers (i.e.,
peer mobile nodes, edge network nodes) to which they can
delegate tasks that cannot be performed in a stand-alone
manner, either because they are too resource-intensive for
the current capability of the device, or because they need
collection of some phenomena/events from multiple nodes.
Our preliminary NDN-based solution proposed in [4] lever-
ages only on standard NDN security mechanisms, which
provide only data authentication. In particular, standard NDN
lacks means to verify that a request for a given content (or
service) is legitimate and also lacks means to provide data
confidentiality. Our extended protocol provides a mechanism
for mutual Consumer-Provider authentication, so that (i) a
Consumer can verify that the candidate Provider is authorized
by an Access Server (AS) to provide the service, and (ii) the
Provider can verify that an AS authorized the Consumer to ask
for the service. Both the service discovery and provisioning
phases are based on a cryptographically confidential and
authenticated packet exchange. We call the resulting protocol
Authenticated Named Data Networking at the Edge (ANDNe).
It is worth noting that we present our extensions to NDN
security in the context on Mobile Edge Computing, but they
can also be considered a starting point for a more secure NDN
in any other application scenario.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II provides background material on our preliminary work in
[4] and clearly specifies the new contributions proposed in this
paper. In Section III ANDNe is presented, starting with the
design of security goals and moving to the detailed protocol
description and operation. In Section IV, the viability of
ANDNe is debated for a reference use case, before concluding
remarks in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONS
A. NDN at the edge: an overview
Although initially conceived as a networking paradigm to
facilitate named content distribution in the future Internet [3],
NDN has been recently gaining momentum as an enabling
technology in the IoT research arena [6], [7], [8]. In this
context, NDN can also be a good candidate to easily support
cloud-like services at the network edge, as presented in [4]
where we first proposed the NDNe (Named Data Network-
ing at the edge) protocol, which extends the legacy NDN
semantics, based on Interest and Data packets exchange, to
support provider discovery and service provisioning at the
mobile edge. The NDNe naming scheme has been designed to
use well-known name prefixes to identify, not only contents,
but different types of services (e.g., content storage, data
compression) and their features.
A Consumer asking for a service looks for a potential
Provider in its neighborhood by broadcasting a modified
Interest packet, called eInt-REQ, containing the name and the
parameters of the requested service. Receiving nodes process
the request and check if they are able to provide the named
service with the specified performance parameters. If it is the
case, the nodes offer themselves as Providers by replying with
an eData-REP packet containing both node and service infor-
mation. The Consumer selects the most convenient candidate
and sends an eInt-CONF packet as a confirmation of the
service acceptance to the Provider, which, in its turn, sends
an eData-ACK as an acknowledgement.
After the provider selection, the service provisioning phase
starts by leveraging the legacy NDN packet exchange. For
instance, if the Consumer asks for a data processing service
(e.g., video compression), the selected Provider retrieves the
content from the Consumer through Interest and Data packets,
and after the content is processed, the Consumer can retrieve
it by issuing Interest packets towards the Provider.
NDNe has been designed as a flexible solution to discover
and access different service types; this implies that customized
selection criteria can be set by the Consumer for choosing the
best Provider(s). The Provider selection phase can yield to the
choice of a single or multiple Providers; an example of the lat-
ter case is when the Consumer asks for a complex processing
service (e.g., transcoding) that needs to be offloaded to many
nodes running distributed tasks in parallel [9].
B. Contributions
The reference mobile edge environment is characterized by
highly dynamic interactions, due to the volatile and intermittent
contacts among involved nodes, whose storage, processing,
battery, and connectivity capabilities may largely vary, as
graphically represented in Figure 1. This is the case, for
instance, of a shopping mall, a leisure place, a road, a
Fig. 1. Reference scenario: data processing, storage and access are available
at the cloud and mobile edge levels.
conference venue, but also emergency response environments,
where heterogeneous nodes, often unknown to each other,
encounter and communicate without a preliminary set up
and without third-party involvement. In these environments,
secure and trusted node interactions must be ensured so that
Consumers and Providers can find each other and agree on the
service to be offered. To this purpose, in this work we overhaul
the basic NDNe operation, by adding specific packet fields
carrying security-related information, to enable the mutual
authentication of Consumers and Providers while preserving
Consumer privacy in the data exchange.
In particular, the service request, which is part of the initial
handshake in NDNe, is cryptographically confidential and
authenticated. To achieve protection against replay attacks and
forward secrecy, the Provider must maintain a list of the public
keys used by the Consumers and reject requests using an old
key. The Provider does not need to keep any other state after
the end of a task and can delete the list when it chooses a
new public key. In this way, the Provider can reuse the same
public key multiple times; thus, answering a service discovery
request is an idempotent operation and the response could be
cached. After the initial eInt-REQ/eData-REP handshake for
Provider discovery, any content transfer is also cryptograph-
ically confidential and authenticated, protected from replay
attacks and enjoys perfect forward secrecy.
With respect to a pure NDN solution, our proposal protects
(i) Consumers against a large class of attacks by dishonest
intermediate nodes such as: eavesdropping of service requests,
user tracking and profiling, man-in-the-middle attacks and
attempts to steal credentials and (ii) Providers are protected
against attempts to obtain service executions requested by
unauthorized users, quite common in the mobile edge [10].
III. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
A. Protocol Design Goals
In this Section we describe the security properties that we
want to achieve in ANDNe. These properties must hold against
any active network attacker that can intercept, modify, drop, or
inject packets and can impersonate or corrupt any Consumer
or Provider nodes. The attacker cannot impersonate or cor-
rupt Consumers or Providers authorized by the Authorization
Server to request or perform a given service. Authorized
Consumers and Providers are honest entities that correctly
execute the protocol.
1) Authentic Advertisements. The Consumers should be
able to detect and drop forged service advertisements.
Otherwise an attacker could profile the list of services
of interest to a Consumer or even trick a Consumer into
sending private data to the attacker.
2) Consumer Privacy. An eavesdropper could determine
the network interface from which a request for service
S is coming but not the associated task parameters and
the Consumer ID. Only the chosen Provider can learn
the ID of the Consumer requesting the service.
3) 0-RTT Mutual Authentication. If the Provider is
already known from a previous discovery phase, the
Consumer should be able to send authenticated input
data in the first packet.
4) Protection from Replay Attacks. The Provider should
drop any duplicate request.
5) Protection from Denial-of-Service Attacks. The
Provider responses to service discovery requests should
require minimal CPU and bandwidth usage, which is
particularly relevant for potentially constrained IoT de-
vices.
To ensure that the protocol is applicable to the context of
NDN, we impose the following constraints:
1) Compatibility with NDN/NDNe. Nodes should com-
municate by leveraging NDN/NDNe primitives, without
additional round trips. Intermediate nodes that are not
involved in the authentication should simply forward the
packets according to the usual rules.
2) No out-of-band pairing and no dependency on exter-
nal online nodes. Consumers and Providers should be
able to communicate to unknown nodes with no setup.
The nodes can rely on trusted third-party nodes that can
operate as registration servers and are not required to be
available during the protocol exchange.
B. Attacker Model and Security Definition
Formally, we consider two major security problems: key-
exchange security and private authentication. For the key-
exchange problem, we assume the attacker model and security
definitions in [11], which in turn is the Canetti-Krawczyk
model of key exchange [12]. The attacker has full control
of the network communication and can intercept, delay, drop,
inject or tamper messages. This includes the ability of activate
protocol entities as initiators or responders of NDN exchanges.
In addition, the attacker can learn the private state of any
session and corrupt any party.
Definition 1 (Key-Exchange Security): Consider an efficient
attacker A, a key exchange between an uncorrupted Consumer
C and an uncorrupted Provider P , and the output of the key
negotiation, atk. The following cryptographic experiment is
done. At the end of the exchange, a Challenger gives the
attacker A a key k, which can be either atk or a random key.
We say that the key exchange is secure if anyA can distinguish
whether it was given atk with probability negligibly close to
1/2.
For the privacy problem, we assume Wu’s attacker model
and definition [11]. In this model, the adversary can passively
observe any exchange and can impersonate any party except
a Consumer authorized to use the service. This requirement
is unavoidable, because any Provider is willing to reveal its
identity to an authorized Consumer.
Definition 2 (Key-Exchange Privacy): Consider an efficient
attacker A, controlling a set of Providers P1, . . . , Pn, and a
special test Consumer whose identity can be either IDT or
ID′T . The attacker A can activate any Provider to generate
any eData-REP or eData-ACK. However, the provider does
not have a valid certificate authorizing the Provider to sign
data packets with any prefix beginning with /S/, where S is
the service requested by the text Consumer. We say that the
key exchange is private if any A can distinguish whether the
Consumer identity is IDT or ID′T with probability negligibly
close to 1/2.
C. Protocol Script
In ANDNe the role of Consumers is played by mobile
devices (e.g., smartphones, tablets, laptops) under the coverage
of one or multiple edge network nodes (e.g., APs, BSs) and
close to many other mobile devices. A Provider may be either
a mobile device or an edge node.
We assume that the prospective Consumer and the prospec-
tive Provider have previously registered themselves with an
AS and received the following public parameters and the
public key certificates described below, which also serve as
authorization tokens:
• The name of the desired service S and a public key
pkS used to confidentially send service parameters to any
authorized Provider.
• A key generation function KDF.
• A public key encryption scheme PK.Enc.
• An Authenticated Encryption Scheme AEnc.
• A group G in which Hash-DH and Strong-DH assump-
tions hold and a generator g of the group.
The Consumer initially knows:
• Its own ID IDC .
• A private signing key and a certificate certC issued by
the AS that binds the Consumer ID to the signing key
and authorizes the Consumer to use the service. We
will indicate with sigC(·) the signatures generated by the
Consumer.
The ith Provider initially knows:
• The private key skS used to decrypt service parameters.
This private key is shared by all the providers.
• The Provider identifier IDi.
• A private signing key and a certificate certi issued by
the AS that authorizes the provider key to sign Data
packets with prefixes /S/discovery/ and /S/IDi/.
This ability also implies that the Provider is authorized
to provide service S.
C P1 P2
eInt-REQ /S/discovery
params=PK.Enc[pkS , task parameters]
{eData-REP /S/discovery/ID1/tid1
keydata=tid1, ID1, gs1 , cert1}P1
{eData-REP /S/discovery/ID2/tid2
keydata=tid2, ID2, gs2 , cert2}P2
eInt-CONF /S/ID2/tid2/sid
keydata= tid2, sid, gx,AEnc[htk, (ID2, IDC , certC ,
sigC(tid, sid, ID2, IDC , g
s2 , gx))]
inputdata= AEnc[eadk, input data]
{eData-ACK /S/ID2/tid2/sid
keydata=tid2, sid, gy,AEnc[htk
′, (tid2, sid, ID2, IDC)]
data=AEnc[atk, task result name]}P2
Subsequent exchanges using key atk.
Fig. 2. Steps of the ANDNe protocol. A Consumer, C, and two Providers
P1 and P2, are shown, which are both able to provide the service S.
In the following, the notation {X}j means that the payload
X is sent in cleartext and also signed by node j using the
usual NDN procedures.
The protocol comprises the following steps (Figure 2),
which overhaul the basic interactions of NDNe with proper
authentication mechanisms:
1) The Consumer encrypts the service parameters using
public key encryption with public key pkS . Encryption
can be omitted if the service parameters are public.
The Consumer includes the resulting ciphertext in the
params field of the request. It then creates a content
name concatenating the service name S and the keyword
/discovery and sends an eInt-REQ packet.
2) Each Provider i receiving the eInt-REQ packet decrypts
the parameter field, obtaining the service parameters.
If the provider is not able to perform the service, it
drops the request. Otherwise it generates a temporary
ID tidi and a temporary private key si. The tuple
(tidi, IDi, g
si , certi) is included in the keydata field
of the answer packet. It creates a content name con-
catenating the original interest, the Provider ID IDi, and
tidi. The answer packet is signed by Pi and is sent as
an eData-REP.
3) The Consumer chooses the provider Pj among the
candidate Providers and retrieves the key data. It verifies
that certj is signed by the AS and then verifies the
packet Pj signature. If any of these steps fails, the
Consumer chooses another provider or stops. Otherwise,
the Consumer derives the keys
(htk,htk’,eadk) = KDF(gsj , gx, gsjx), (1)
generates a session id sid and a session private key
x. Then it signs the tuple (tidj , sid, IDj , IDC , gsj , gx)
and encrypts the result, along with IDj , IDC , and certC
using htk obtaining the string c′3. The specification of
the service to be performed, including any pointer to the
input data, is encrypted using eatk obtaining the string
c′′3 . Finally it creates an eInt-CONF packet for the con-
tent name /S/IDj/tid/sid and includes tidj, sid, gx, c′3
in the keydata parameter and c′′3 in the inputdata
parameter.
4) The Provider Pj derives the keys (htk, htk′, eadk) using
(1) and retrieves the encrypted content. Then, it verifies
the authenticity of the certificate certC and that the
Consumer is authorized to use the service. Then, it
verifies the Consumer signature. If any of these steps
fails, then the Provider stops. Otherwise, it proceeds to
execute the required task, including the retrieval of any
required input. Then, it generates a private key y and
derives the key
atk = KDF(gsj , gx, gsjx, gy, gxy).
The Provider encrypts the tuple (tidj , sid, IDj , IDC) us-
ing htk′ obtaining c′4 and the service result using atk
obtaining c′′4 . Finally, the Provider sends an eData-ACK
packet including tid, sid, gy , c′4 in the keydata field,
and c′′4 in the data field.
D. Evaluation of Protocol Overhead
For the computation of message overhead we assume the
following cryptosystems. For symmetric encryption, we con-
sider AES with the Galois Counter Mode of operation (GCM),
which adds to the message size a 128-bit nonce and a 128-bit
authentication tag. Symmetric keys are generated via the Ellip-
tic Curve Diffie-Hellman protocol (ECDH) defined over a 256-
bit-sized prime field. Considering some overhead, each point
is encoded as a 512-bit string. For asymmetric encryption, we
adopt a hybrid scheme in which standard RSA with key length
of 2048 bits is used to encrypt a randomly generated key of
128 bits. For signatures, we adopt the ECDSA algorithm with
key size 256 bits, which results in an encoded signature length
of 576 bits. The size of the certificates is assumed to be 8400
bits, whereas party IDs and temporary IDs are assumed to be
128 bits long. The overheads due to the cryptographic content
of each message are reported in Table I. Note that the most
significant contribution to the sizes of the eData-REP and
eInt-CONF is the size of the included certificates.
In terms of computational complexity, the most expensive
operations necessary to process an eInt-REQ message are
TABLE I






a public key encryption at the Consumer side and a corre-
sponding decryption at each Provider. These operations can
be waived in case of resource constraints, at the expense
of some privacy loss. Generating an eData-REP requires a
point multiplication on the elliptic curve, and a signature.
Since the same eData-REP can be precomputed and reused
to answer multiple messages, the cost for the Provider is
negligible. Instead, the Consumer must pay the verification of
a packet signature. Both the eInt-CONF and the eData-ACK
messages require two point multiplications and a signature
generation at the transmitter side and a point multiplications
and a signature verification at the receiver side. These are the
two most expensive messages in the protocol. However, they
are used when the service discovery phase is finished and must
be paid only once for each service request. Therefore, their
cost can be amortized in the cost of the service itself.
E. Security Discussion
This Section discusses how the proposed scheme provides
key-exchange security and privacy according to the definitions
in Section III-B. The protocol exchanges two different keys
between the Consumer and the Provider. An early key eadk
and a final key atk. With respect to key atk, the cryptographic
part of our authentication protocol is very similar to the Private
Service Discovery Protocol (PSDP) in [11], which in turn is a
variation of SIGMA-I [13]. There are two differences between
our protocol and PSDP: (1) in ANDNe, the provider certifi-
cate and the provider signature in the eData-REP message
are not encrypted, whereas in PSDP the server’s broadcast
message they are encrypted and (2) in ANDNe, the eData-
ACK message is signed even though it is also protected by
means of the Authenticated Encryption scheme. Both these
modifications have no impact on the security proof in [11,
Theorem E.1]. Therefore, key atk is secure as in Definition 1.
Similarly to PSDP, the ANDNe protocol negotiates the early
key eadk, which can be used to encrypt and authenticate the
input data in the eInt-CONF message. This makes it possible
for the Consumer to send the service parameters while the
key exchange is still ongoing, thus saving at least one round-
trip time in the service request. Security of the key eadk was
proved in [11, Theorem E.2] using the one-pass model, which
does not guarantee perfect forward secrecy and makes the
Provider vulnerable to replay attacks. In fact, each Provider
reuses the same private key for different exchange with dif-
ferent Consumers. This makes it possible to cache the eData-
REP message, allowing the Consumer to avoid multiple key
generations and broadcasts and allowing Consumers to send
eInt-CONF messages without repeating the Service Discovery
phase. The price is that an attacker could replay an old eInt-
CONF resulting in a spurious Consumer authentication. To
prevent these replay attacks, the Provider must keep track of
the public keys advertised by the Consumers and drop any
eInt-CONF packets that reuse an old key gx until the Provider
changes its own key pair. It is worth noting that the key space
is large, so it is unlikely that a honest Consumer reuses a
public key. If the Provider performs such bookkeeping, also
the early key eadk is secure as defined in Definition 1. This
is the only bookkeeping required to the Provider.
Regarding key-exchange privacy, ANDNe provides Con-
sumer privacy. Since disclosing the Provider ID is necessary
for packet routing and signing, implementing mutual privacy
requires modifications to how NDN nodes manage NDNe
packets, which is out of the scope of this paper. Formally,
we note that privacy against passive attackers is guaranteed be-
cause the eInt-REQ message is encrypted with a semantically
secure encryption scheme and the subsequent key exchange is
analogous the the SIGMA-I protocol, which is private against
passive attackers [13]. With respect to active attackers, the
Consumer verifies any incoming eData-REP messages and
drops them if they do not contain a valid certificate signed
by the Authorization Server. Therefore, the Consumer never
reveals its ID to an attacker-controlled Provider.
With respect to our design goals, we observe the following.
Goal 1 (Authentic Advertisements) is a consequence of pro-
tocol security in the CK model. Goal 2 (Consumer Privacy)
is obtained by encrypting the Consumer ID and signatures.
Goal 3 (0-RTT Mutual Authentication) is a consequence of
protocol security in the one-pass model. Goal 4 (Protection
from Replay) is obtained with the bookkeeping described
above. Finally, Goal 5 (Protection form Denial-of-Service) is
guaranteed because eData-REP messages can be cached and
repeated at each service discovery request.
IV. REFERENCE USE CASE
To show how the envisioned mechanism works in practice,
we consider the following exemplary emergency scenario.
The town of Alice is struck by a Category 4 hurricane.
Fortunately, she is safe, but her house is devastated. Fallen
trees and power poles have isolated almost all the residential
area. When the storm melts away, Alice makes an high quality
(full HD) video of her house and the surrounding environment
and tries to send it to the local Emergency Management
Agency, which has prepared a crisis response service. Since
the phone line and the nearby Wi-Fi hot spots are down, the
authorities are arranging access points (APs) in the streets as
data mules, to collect information about the damages and offer
connectivity to the people.
Alice finds the emergency AP service, but realizes that the
connection is slow, probably due to congestion, and a long
video upload is infeasible. So, Alice decides to perform a video
compression to reduce the cost of the communication. Such
application is not available in her smartphone and she needs
to demand the compression task to another nearby device.
ANDNe comes into the picture right now: it can arrange secure
services between close devices (e.g., the smartphone of Alice
neighbours), by leveraging ad hoc connectivity.
Alice’s smartphone acts as an NDNe consumer C
and broadcasts an eInt-REQ to discover 1-hop far
away providers. The request includes: (i) the concate-
nation of service name and the keyword discovery,
/videocompression/discovery, in the name field, (ii)
the service parameters that specify the video size and format,
the current quality in terms of definition (1080p) and the
expected lower quality (360p), in the parameter field. The
service parameters are encrypted with the public key common
to all the authorized providers of the video compression
service. This makes it impossible to an attacker to fingerprint
Alice’s device and track her movements.
Two authorized devices, P1 and P2, receive the request,
decrypt the parameter field and realize they can manage the
service. Both nodes defer the transmission of the eData-REP
message by a time whose duration is inversely proportional to
their ability in performing the service [4]. This message is not
encrypted.
In our example, P1 has more available resources than P2 and
sends the reply first. The eData-REP is signed by P1, which
has generated a temporary private key s1, and it includes as
content name the concatenation of the eInt-REQ’s name, the
provider ID ID1, and a temporary ID tid1.
C verifies that P1 is an authorized service provider and
sends an eInt-CONF packet, as a confirmation of the service
request. This message also conveys the Consumer’s ephemeral
public key gx, a unique identifier of the service request, sid,
and the name of content that P1 should retrieve and re-encode.
These parameters are encrypted to avoid fingerprinting and
tracking of Alice’s device and to protect the confidentiality
of the names of Alice’s content. Additionally, this message is
signed with Alice’s key. This is different from standard NDN
behavior in which Interest packets are not signed. ANDNe
introduces this signature because an eInt-CONF is a service
request which might be expensive to execute and for which
Alice should be accountable.
Upon reception of this message, P1 checks that the unique
identifier sid and the ephemeral public key gx are new and
that Alice is authorized to request the service. If any of
these checks fails, P1 stops the protocol. Otherwise, it sends
an eData-ACK as an acknowledgement and specifies the
name that it will give to the processed content (to allow
subsequent retrieval from C). This message is encrypted using
the exchanged key atk and can be decrypted only by C.
P1 then issues a standard NDN Interest packet for the
content to be processed, and a sequence of NDN Interest and
Data packets is exchanged. In this scenario, the content to be
processed is provided by the same node requesting the service,
but it could be any content in the network. These packets
are encrypted and authenticated using key atk, except for
the content name, which is necessary for routing the packets.
However, this name can be generated randomly and conveys
no information. As soon as P1 begins receiving the content,
it can start executing the requested task. At the expiration of
the estimated processing time (as announced in the eData-
REP), C starts issuing Interest packets with the name of
the processed data. These packets are also encrypted and
authenticated using key atk.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose ANDNe, a novel protocol for
privacy-friendly service discovery and access which enhances
the legacy NDN Interest/Data handshake to carry-out ser-
vice discovery and Provider selection procedures in edge
computing scenarios, by building trust between the involved
parties (i.e., heterogeneous consumer and IoT devices and
network nodes at the edge). Among many possible attractive
applications of the protocol, to showcase how ANDNe works
in practice, we discussed the offload of a video compression
task demanded from a mobile device to a nearby node in the
edge under emergency conditions.
Future works will be devoted to quantitatively assess the
performance of ANDNe and its effective resilience to possible
attacks under a wide range of possible use-cases (spanning
different service types/workloads, mobility patterns, commu-
nication technologies).
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